PACIFIC ISLANDS REPORT

Pacific Islands Development Program/East-West Center
With Support From Center for Pacific Islands Studies/University of Hawai‘i

By Jon Fraenkel

The Solomon Islands government is currently considering introducing laws aimed at strengthening political parties, at restricting members of parliament from crossing the floor and at halting excessive use of ‘no confidence’ motions.

Similar kinds of legislation have been introduced in many parts of the Pacific, including Vanuatu, Fiji, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea. The Samoans have legal controls on what kinds of new parties can be formed. Even those from Tahiti in French Polynesia have become so frustrated with continual government change that they altered the electoral law hoping to stabilise the political order.

Several objectives can be served by political party integrity legislation. Sometimes, the aim is greater parliamentary stability, sometimes nation-building, and sometimes it is driven by the view that political parties are an inevitable feature of ‘proper’ democracy (although Ancient Greece, the ‘cradle of democracy’ never had political parties and nor do many local councils in the mass democracies of Western Europe or Australiasia).

Often, the real objective is to strengthen governments, rather than political parties. In several cases, laws against MPs crossing the floor have been introduced in the hope of consolidating one political faction, but have ended up strengthening another. That is what happened in Papua New Guinea and Fiji. In PNG, the government of Sir Mekere Morauta introduced laws binding MPs to political parties, but Sir Michael Somare won the 2002 election and his government proved the beneficiary of the new laws. In Fiji, Sitiveni Rabuka’s government amended the constitution to prevent floor-crossing in 1997, but Mahendra Chaudhry won the 1999 election. The new law ensured that Chaudhry’s Fiji Labour Party’s 37 seats in the 71-member parliament was an unbreakable majority. Rebels could not switch sides. A year later, Fiji witnessed a coup d’etat.

In other cases, laws binding MPs to political parties have not worked as intended. In India, more MPs crossed the floor after 1985 legislation aimed at preventing floor-crossing than beforehand. In Vanuatu, Serge Vohor passed laws providing a ‘grace period’ during which there could not be a ‘no confidence’ motion in 2004, but this was ruled unconstitutional by the courts and the Vohor government was subsequently toppled. In New Zealand, laws against MPs switching sides simply delayed inevitable political realignments, and political opinion turned against their continued usage.

In PNG, the rules against floor-crossing contained in the Organic Law on Political Parties and Candidates (OLIPPAC) have not yet been fully tested before the courts.

Eleven members changed political parties during Somare’s 2002-7 government, but none lost their seats. The law was not complied with.

What will happen in PNG when a Prime Minister finds himself politically isolated and unpopular? Will the law be complied with? What will happen if only the law prevents the fall of a government? We do not know.

Some within the PNG judiciary suggest that, in such circumstances, OLIPPAC may not withstand a constitutional challenge. The courts may rule the law null and void because it restrains MPs freedom of movement.

How does OLIPPAC work in PNG?

First, under OLIPPAC the party with the largest number of seats after an election gets the first opportunity to form a government. That law helped Sir Michael Somare’s National Alliance to form the government a second time after the July 2007 elections, for this was the largest party.

Second, MPs in PNG who vote for a particular Prime Minister cannot vote against that Prime Minister in any votes of confidence, budgetary votes and votes on constitutional amendments. There are loopholes. If a party decides collectively to switch sides - in accordance with its internal rules and procedures - it can do so. For that reason, many Papua New Guinea politicians constituted themselves as one-man political parties, and so retained their freedom to switch to and fro.

Third, there are financial incentives to join parties, and disincentives to remaining as independents.

The other key part of PNG’s package is ‘grace periods’ which were introduced separately as part of the 1975 constitution, and extended in 1992. After an election, a new government has 18 months during which there cannot be a ‘no confidence’ motion. And if there is a ‘no confidence’ motion in the last 12 months of the life of a parliament’s five-year term, parliament gets dissolved and there is an early election. Since MPs always want to prolong their periods in office, there never has been a ‘no confidence’ motion in the last year of a PNG parliament’s five-yearly term.

That shows one interesting way of maintaining the safety valve of ‘no confidence’ motions, while ensuring that these are not used in a frivolous manner or simply to grab hold of ministerial portfolios or for fund-raising. If a no confidence vote entails a general dissolution of parliament and an early election, MPs will only take this option if they are riding the crest of a wave of popular dissatisfaction with government. Under normal circumstances, as the PNG history indicates, they will not want to rock the boat if that means going back to face the electorate earlier than normal.

What has been the impact of OLIPPAC in PNG?

First, the number of political parties has risen, not fallen. It has followed a wave-like motion. After OLIPPAC, the number of registered parties rose to 43 in 2002. It fell back due to amalgamations and de-registration of parties with no seats at all to around 15 in 2006, and those rose again ahead of the 2007 election to 34.

Second, no MP has as yet lost his or her seat due to this law, although there were many breaches of OLIPPAC. In that respect, the law was a paper tiger.

Third, Sir Michael Somare’s 2002-7 government was the first since independence to survive a full term in office. In that sense, the law brought stability. The Prime Minister did not change, but many of the ministers changed regularly and there were frequent associated changes at the top levels of the public sector bureaucracy.

No confidence challenges were avoided during Somare’s 2002-7 government not only due to the 18-month grace period and OLIPPAC, but also by suspension of parliament at critical junctures when opposition forces were mustering for a challenge.

There are always dangers associated with laws aimed at restricting ‘no confidence’ challenges or binding MPs to political parties. They may stabilise popular governments, avoid frivolous ‘no confidence’ motions and permit parliament to concentrate on law-making, but they may also remove the ability to dislodge a corrupt administration or entrench an unpopular government.

The history of usage of such laws in the Pacific Islands tells us that they often have unexpected and even bizarre consequences.